The military junta will convene regional parliaments — State and Region Hluttaws —on March 20, according to the results of the 2026 elections it organized. At this time, there are many questions for ethnic-based political parties that contested under the banner of peace and justice.
The central question is whether they will genuinely represent the people’s voices in parliament, or whether they will serve merely as filler parties propping up the military’s 2008 Constitution. In the three-phase election, Kachin State-based parties won in only a handful of constituencies.
No Freedom, No Justice, No Representation
Among all elections held in Myanmar since 2010, the 2026 election had the lowest level of public participation and fairness, according to a former Kachin State parliament candidate who contested in 2020.
“Rather than talking about fairness, if you compare this election to the conditions during 2010, 2015, and 2020, public participation and the threshold for party participation were at an all-time low. Looking at these factors, one can clearly see that freedom and fairness were completely absent.”
Elections were held in only 10 of Kachin State’s 18 townships.
Four Kachin State-based parties contested: the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP), the New Democracy Party-Kachin (NDPK), the Lisu National Development Party (LNDP), and the Tai-Leng (Red Shan) National Development Party (TNDP).
As expected, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) swept nearly all seats across all three levels of parliament in all 10 townships where elections were held, while state-based parties suffered major defeats.
Sources close to the KSPP said the party secured three wins: one seat via the proportional representation (PR) system in Kachin State Constituency No. 1; former KSPP chairperson Dr. Manam Tu Ja in Constituency No. 2 for the Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House); and one Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) seat in Putao’s Machangbaw township.
Out of approximately 25 KSPP candidates who contested across all three levels of parliament, only three won.
Another state party, the New Democracy Party-Kachin (NDPK), won two State Hluttaw seats via PR in SawLaw and Injangyang townships. The Tai-Leng (Red Shan) National Development Party (TNDP) won one Amyotha Hluttaw seat for a Shan ethnic representative, and two PR seats in the State Hluttaw.
In all 10 townships where the election was held, the USDP dominated, winning up to nine seats through the PR system.
Additionally, the USDP also claimed two State Hluttaw seats in Putao’s Naungmun and Shwegu townships without competition, according to candidates who contested.
Of Kachin State’s 18 townships, eight contain territory controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). As such, the military was unable to hold elections in five additional townships.
Although the military junta claimed elections were held at the township level, in practice, voting only took place in urban wards under military control.
A KSPP candidate who contested elaborated on the many obstacles that prevented state-based parties from winning:
“The USDP is like a government — they know exactly which villages and wards they are strong in, and where other parties have strength. Where they are strong, they invest effort. Where other parties are strong, there tend to be many disqualifications.”
During the election period, major competing parties — including the National League for Democracy (NLD) — and some political leaders were barred from participating.
The Kachin National Congress (KNC) planned to contest, but the Union Election Commission (UEC) denied their application for registration.
A Kachin political analyst said the military held the elections merely as political theater, effectively eliminating any party that could obstruct its operations:
“They did not select any political party or individual who might bring critical voices that would become obstacles in future parliaments. Parties with major public support, like the National League for Democracy (NLD), were excluded. Looking at all of this together, I see the military as having removed anything that could threaten its power.”
There was widespread criticism that the parties allowed to participate in the military’s elections were only those aligned with — or likely to become allied with — the military.
For Peace or for Military Continuity?
Political parties campaigned on promises of achieving the peace the people desire, establishing federal democracy, and securing equal rights.
The Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) declared its party objectives: national peace and stability, justice, equality, multi-ethnic unity, and the emergence of a federal democratic union.
A KSPP representative who contested said he is cautiously optimistic that some peace-related changes may come after the new government is formed:
“I do hope that once the new government is formed, some degree of peace will come to the country. By hope, I mean there might be room for negotiations — but I do not mean 100%.”
However, analysts say the current election is not about peace, but about sustaining the military’s 2008 Constitution to keep the military in a dominant leadership role and ensure its continued grip on power.
A Kachin political analyst who contested in the 2020 elections said that as long as the military clings to the 2008 Constitution, ethnic parties can accomplish nothing:
“For ethnic parties — whether we look at 2010, 2015, or 2020, win or lose — nothing substantive could be done. What I mean is, the 2008 Constitution which the military enforces is simply a constitution under which ethnic parties are not permitted to do anything meaningful.”
Kachin political analysts also noted that in the successive governments following the 2010 and 2015 elections, the voices of ethnic parties in parliament under the 2008 Constitution had negligible impact.
Daw Seng Mai, Director of Kachin Human Rights Watch (KHRW), said that as long as ethnic parties operate under the military without first pursuing a ceasefire and decisive path towards peace, then peace will remain out of reach:
“They are entering a violent system when they should not. Without first finding a path to bring the military to peace talks, joining and speaking within the military’s own framework — no matter how capable a party claims to be — they will remain under military control.”
Consequently, the parties that contested ostensibly for peace are now widely criticized as having become instruments of the military junta.
The Union Advisory Council
On February 3, while the coup leader was serving as interim president, the Union Advisory Council law was promulgated.
The Union Advisory Council law, issued by the military council under the 2008 Constitution, enables the president to form a council to advise and coordinate on matters of national security and the rule of law, peace-related matters, and legislative affairs.
The law stipulates that the president must form the advisory council with no fewer than five members, including a secretary.
Daw Seng Mai further explained that this amounts to the military establishing direct control over the incoming government:
“As for who will sit on this advisory council — it will be the same people from Min Aung Hlaing’s inner-circle. It is no different from 2010, when Thein Sein’s government came in by simply taking off their military uniforms and entering as a civilian government. The military council is positioning itself to continue controlling whatever government emerges.”
Political analysts are widely critical, saying the military council’s formation of the advisory council is designed to exert power over the incoming government.
A Kachin political analyst who contested in 2020 said:
“I do not know exactly how the new government will lead, but I expect many people from the military side will be in this advisory council. My sense is that the advisory council will be the real controlling force — and that this is how the government machinery will take shape.”
Since the Union Advisory Council will continue to direct and oversee the incoming government, analysts say the current landscape in Myanmar is not conducive to meaningful reform.
The Resistance and the 2008 Constitution
The National Unity Government (NUG) — which is actively resisting the military junta — along with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), has abolished the 2008 Constitution.
At an event marking the 65th anniversary of Kachin Revolution Day on February 9, the Kachin Independence Council (KIC) Vice-Chairman and Lt. Gen. Gun Maw also spoke about the abrogation of the 2008 Constitution:
“The interim agreement between KPICT (Kachin Political Interim Consultative Team) and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) was dated May 27, 2021. The agreement itself is short. After the military council forcibly seized state power on February 1, 2021, the CRPH announced the complete abolition of the 2008 Constitution. We recognize the actions taken by the CRPH.”
Thus, while resistance organizations have abolished the 2008 Constitution, the political parties that contested in the military’s election continue to operate under its framework. Those parties will ultimately follow the military junta’s roadmap under the 2008 Constitution — not their positions on peace.
The military council has announced that State and Region Hluttaw sessions will commence on March 20 to set this plan into motion, and elected representatives must report no later than March 15.
